I feel like Butler's principle argument in the beginning of this chapter is that the category of "woman" creates a paradox of representation. The category of "woman" needs to be a subject in order to be represented, because "representation is extended only to what can be acknowledged as a subject" (2), but as that category can liberate women through the right to representation, it also restricts her. Butler asks, "Is the construction of the category of women as a coherent and stable subject and unwitting regulation and reification of gender relations? And is not such a reification precisely contrary to feminist aims?" (7). Her point, if I am not mistaken, is that women can only be "women" within the previously existing, dualistic, patriarchal construct of male/female and masculine/feminine. Thus, in using the term "women" to represent the subject of feminism feminists are simultaneously freeing the woman by allowing her representation and restricting her by using the language of binary sex and gender constructions.
Butler's comments on language and the idea that men have male bodies and women have female bodies reminded me of this issue which came up because of the recent political battles over birth control.
Feministing: Ways of talking about "The War on Women" that leave people out
The gist of the article is that calling attempts to withhold birth control a "war on women" assumes that "woman"="person with vagina"/"person with uterus"/"person who can gestate babies". Butler's statement which particularly reminded me of this was on page 9, when she writes: "Assuming for the moment the stability of binary sex, it does not follow that the construction of 'men' will accrue exclusively to the bodies of males or that 'women' will interpret only female bodies". There is an added issue when we consider that binary sex is a myth created to reinforce notions of binary gender ("gender must also designate the very apparatus of production whereby the sexes themselves are established" i.e. notions of gender come before notions of sex [Butler, 10]) and sex is impossible to define. "Is it natural, anatomical, chromosomal, or hormonal...?" (Butler, 9). How do we categorize persons born with female-appearing bodies and XY chromosomes? Refusing to recognize "woman" as something one becomes ignores and alienates specifically transsexuals and intersex persons, and if there is issue concerning how sex is categorized it can even alienate a female-born woman whose body is perhaps not as "womanly" as another's.
4 comments:
This is really interesting, Sarah. I think that the idea that you presented about the problem of categorization in regards to women is really a serious issue. We talk in my gender and sexuality class all the time about this problem of labeling. To say that someone is a woman or a man assumes that they fall under a specific category as defined by "society." Society seems to focus on a hegemonic definition of feminine and masculine. To be a man, you have to like cars and dirt and working out. And to be a woman, you must have big boobs, smell like flowers, and have shiny shampoo commercial hair. The problem with hegemony is that it doesn't account for those who do not fit the cookie cutters. I think that Butler recognizes this problem, and like the rest of us, is not sure of how to fix it.
So I totally didn't mean to hit publish.. So here's the continuation of my other comment... I also like the idea that a woman is both liberated by the ability to have her own representation and constrained by her representation in the way that she is now tied to feminism.
There are a lot of negative connotations associated with feminism. To quote my gender and sexuality professor, "When you hear the word feminist, you probably think of unshaven man-hating lesbians." This negative association along with many others prevents feminism from existing free from prejudice. And because we live in a man's world, masculinity just does not have the same negative connotations. I think this presents an interesting but almost impossible problem.
I definitely agree that this is interesting and I have also come across similar issues of representation, socially established norms and terminology, and also labeling. This is a fascinating paradox. What I think is being seen here is something like what Burke was talking about with "Terministic Screens." Each "specializing" unit (let's say the author of the article and the political institution) has defined or considered the question of "gender" differently both through the use of different terminology and observation. Thus, each of these representations is casting a shadow of sorts, what Burke might identify as "[directing] the attention to one field rather than to another" (Burke, 46). Of course, the "othering" this suggests is absolutely necessary for the perpetuation of either terministic frame. Without it, there would be no paradox to be examined or explained.
The fact that both of these discourses direct attention (and cast a certain light and shadow upon their subject), suggests also that this subject does not yet have access to a unifying screen. I think that this paradox is most easily solvable using one of the frames Burke proposed: Logology "the systematic study of...terms" (Burke, 47) in combination with another of Burke's ideas. According to Burke, "we think of one another as persons" (Burke, 53). If you unite both of these frames, I think you begin to edge close to a human frame that unravels the paradox. The "people" who need to be represented can certainly be represented when viewed as people.
Of course, this does not and cannot solve any problems with the term itself. Being based in society, I don't know that "woman" is a term that will be discarded any time soon. However, the term may cease to be used as a definitive terministic screen, which would help alleviate the representative tension I think is being underlined by both Sarah and Butler.
While I totally agree with you that the category of women creates a paradox of representation, It would seem that Butler is mostly concerned with essentializing the term "women" and the attempt to establish an understanding of patriarchy that is universal. Butler asks a very poignant question: "Is there some commonality among 'women' that preexists their oppression, or do 'women' have a bond by virtue of their oppression alone?"(5). It seems that Butler is aiming for an understanding of feminism that recognizes the complex diversity of women across cultures, while also understanding that patriarchal oppression is not universal. Butler suggests that "the presumed universality and unity of the subject of feminism is effectively undermined by the constraints of the representational discourse in which it functions"(6).
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