February 12, 2012

Oh Boy


Derrida makes no sense.

Allow me to amend that: Derrida makes sense in the way that an astrophysicist would make sense if he was explaining why a Frisbee glides on the air to his five year old child who has not quite even grasped the concept of “flicking the wrist.” This an exaggeration, of course, but honestly Derrida’s language is much more complicated than it needs to be. It seems really to be a game he is playing. “…what can be shown, presented as a present, a being-present in its truth, the truth of a present or the presence of a present” (Derrida, 282). Why not just say that we can only expose those things which have some basis in the present or something to that effect?

In fact, what is the point of proposing that “Differance is neither a word nor a concept” (Derrida, 279)? It is certainly true that “differance” is not a word. My “spellcheck” insistently changes it to “difference” automatically. Locke might argue that it could be a word. When speaking about meaning he mentions that “a man may use what words he pleases to signify his own ideas to himself” (Locke, 817). However, we can assume that Derrida is correct in proposing that “differance” (spellchecked again) is not a word.

But how can something not be a concept? All a concept is, is the basis of an idea. For most people a “concept” is the idea of something that you wish to share with someone else. A tree is a concept. Perhaps not for most people, but certainly to an infant. To conceive of something so massive and identify it as a single being and then signify that conception with a word is a concept that one has attained. Even if we take Derrida’s proposition that differance “is not, does not exist…” (Derrida, 282), this does not excuse it from being a conception. Even nothingness itself is a concept.

But perhaps Derrida is getting at a different idea of conception than that which I have so far explored. It is difficult to say if this is a correct reading of Derrida’s ideas, but it is an interesting idea. Think about nothingness for one moment; true nonexistence. Can you honestly do it? Is it possible to truly understand the essence of it? Could it be that Derrida is taking Locke’s idea that many words often miss the marks of their true essence (“where the signification of the word and the real essence of the thing are not exactly the same” (Locke, 818)) and extending it to conceptual information? In a way, can certain concepts be truly understood?

I could very well have read into this in a way not meant by Derrida, but I accuse him of actively playing with language to show off and muddle the essential conceptions of his own propositions. Perhaps that is part of the point, but without background information I can only guess. Somewhat bitterly.

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