Differences and Deceit in Locke and Richards and Ogden

To poorly attempt answer the prompt given, in short I believe the difference between Locke's piece and Richards and Ogden's is what they believe words stand for. For Locke, "words are used for recording and communicating our thoughts" (817). Although the Richards and Ogden concede that words as, "symbols direct and organize, record and communicate. In stating [this], we have to distinguish as always between Thoughts and Things" (1274). They go on to say that essentially there is something missing to the relationship between words and thoughts, for there is always some sort of external referent. Although Locke mentions that there is certainly a external reference for our thoughts (when he discusses substance), he does not examine the relationship between words and their referents as in depth. Quite honestly, I'm still confused about the subtle differentiations between what exactly the theories are proposing, since I feel like they're quite similar in their arguments. What fascinates me much more though, is the discussion they both have on deceit in language.

Locke addresses this idea when he says, "all the artificial and figurative applications of words eloquence hath invented, are for nothing else but to insinuate wrong ideas, move the passions, and thereby mislead the judgment" (827). In this sense, words are incredibly powerful since certain uses of them can ultimately affect how another person views a situation. Richards and Ogden's thoughts are similar to Locke's in that words are definitely tools of deceit, but they have different opinions on how to resolve (or not resolve) this issue. Locke, in the final line of his essay, says, "it is vain to find fault with those arts of deceiving, wherein men find pleasure to be deceived" (827). This is somewhat of a hopeless attitude to have, since in Locke's eyes deceit is inevitable and men actually like to be deceived. No solution is given to prevent this deception, perhaps because Locke thinks it unavoidable. Richards and Ogden are a bit more hopeful though, saying that at least, "the naive interpreter is likely on many occasions to be seriously misled if the existence of this unpleasing trait... is overlooked" (1278). In essence, they are saying that deception could at least be detected part of the time if the listener is aware that he is prone to be deceived.