During my “trace” work of the first Aristotle reading I found something that to me seemed oddly contradictory. As Aristotle begins his discussion of goodness by discussing the Good in the arts, he mentions that some arts are better or superior than others and “the ends of the master arts are things more to be desired that all those of the arts subordinate to them” (5). It is also implied throughout the text that goodness is something that we should all strive to be, as it is a goal that will make us happy once achieved. With this idea of goodness and superiority, along with the notion that goodness would induce happiness, it would seem that superiority or quality is both good and gives happiness. Hence, goodness and happiness are bound in quality.
But then later in the text he points out that “doing well” and living “the good life” are not the same as happiness, and that “what constitutes happiness is a matter of dispute” (11). The meaning of happiness changes, he says. For instance, when you are hungry the hope of eating soon is happiness, but another time happiness may constitute passing your math final. This makes sense, but if we as people should be seeking goodness and with goodness comes happiness, does that mean that goodness can be just as slavish to circumstance as happiness? The way Aristotle talks of happiness, he makes it sound like a capricious and ever-changing emotion (which is can be, in specific day-to-day events) while goodness or “the Good” is apparently this set thing that cannot be changed. Goodness can’t be swayed in specific circumstances, or be used for something negative, it can only be mistaken for something else. For example, “the generality of men an the most vulgar identify the Good with pleasure” (18).
But here is where I am confused. If it is implied that goodness is something that naturally brings happiness, and happiness as seen as changing and unreliable, is not goodness just as malleable? Can’t we say that what’s good now might not be good later? Not really, because Aristotle says that “Nor yet will the Ideal Good be any more good because it is eternal” (21). But that doesn’t seem right. How can goodness be this constant, unchanging and wonderful goal that brings happiness when happiness is said to change to easily? Is he contradicting what he said about happiness and goodness being entwined? Or is he just amending it by mentioning that happiness and the subject of happiness can change while good remains constant? Is not Eudemonia the ultimate happiness that is also a must-achieve goal?
….and now my brain hurts.
1 comment:
Emily- First off, I would like to commend you on your blog. These are terrific questions that sent me feverishly flipping through my copy of Aristotle trying to find an answer to some of them. Here's a try:
I think it is important to note that in Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle is not trying to be a moral teacher giving us a sound answer to troubling ethical problems. Rather, through his discourse, he is analyzing previous definitions of a given ethical subject and revealing their shortcomings in order to come to a more concise definition or answer. In his discussion about happiness he is not equating happiness with goodness, he is simply telling us how others have defined happiness and he finds it insufficient as a definition for goodness. He states "that beside the many good things we have mentioned, there exists another Good, that is good in itself"(11).
It seems that Aristotle is looking for a definition of goodness that encompasses all the definitions he mentions in the text. For this he states "Perhaps we may define it as that for the sake of which everything else is done"(25). He is essentially saying that honor, happiness, and virtue are all good things but none of the ultimate good. They are simply parts of the greater good which all good actions strive for.
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